release v0.33.1: two Windows accounts can share one project (#317) #320
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Fixes #317. Field case: two different Windows accounts, an admin account and a desktop user, work in the same project folder. The account that writes the index locks the other one out.
What changes
SetNamedSecurityInfoW) when the owner opens the index. Any other protected DACL is left alone and reported.daemon.tomlstays owner-only, because it holds that daemon's token. The second account gets an immediate, permanentindex_unavailable_other_accountrefusal that names the other account and the remedies (stop that daemon, work as that account, or--no-daemon --db <path>). Neverwarming_up, and no respawn loop.daemon-<pid>.tomlbeside it when it cannot remove it.doctorreports an index whose ACL is narrower than its folder.harden_permissions.Verification (Linux, local)
-D warningsfor Linux and windows-gnu, pluscargo doc -D warnings --document-private-items.other_account_daemon_e2e2/2 on both legs, non-root andCOSI_TEST_AS_ROOT=1.index_access_denied_e2e,schema_newer_refusal_e2e,index_state_disclosure_e2e,oneshot_daemon_e2e,query_cli,exit_reasons_e2e,warmup_e2e, plus the mcp-server,perms/db,doctorand daemonlifecycle/takeover/restartlib tests.version_site_registry,release_notes_quoting,doc_citation_gate.Only native Windows CI can confirm
daemon.tomlrefuses its own owner, andowner_ofnames the owner.daemon.tomland publishesdaemon-<pid>.toml.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_0126PDDLB4wNHxKXvWM1VNmu
Native Windows CI fired the staging control ('the SYSTEM-only DACL did not lock this runner out of daemon.toml'). The daemon writes daemon.toml owner-only (explicit OWNER RIGHTS + user-SID entries, restrict_to_owner); icacls /inheritance:r /grant:r removes only INHERITED entries and only replaces SYSTEM's grant, so the explicit entries survived. The crashed case passed because its daemon.toml is written by the test and carries only inherited entries. /reset first, then the SYSTEM-only DACL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0126PDDLB4wNHxKXvWM1VNmuNative Windows CI fired restrict_to_owner_applies_a_protected_dacl's CONTROL ('the file must start unprotected'). #317 moved dacl_is_protected onto read_dacl (GetNamedSecurityInfoW), while the control still wrote its unprotected DACL with the legacy SetFileSecurityW, which does not mark the DACL unprotected the way the named API reports it. The control now goes through the same SetNamedSecurityInfoW + UNPROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION path the product's set_inheriting_dacl uses (extracted as set_unprotected_explicit_dacl; production behaviour unchanged). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0126PDDLB4wNHxKXvWM1VNmu